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Introduction 
The extremely high cost of aerospace battery 
failures due to internal shorts makes it essential that their 
occurrence be very rare, if not eliminated altogether. With 
Li-ion cells/batteries, the potentially catastrophic safety 
hazard that some internal shorts present adds additional 
incentive for prevention. Prevention can be achieved by 
design, manufacturing measures, and testing.  
Specifically for NASA’s spacesuit application, a 
Li-ion polymer pouch cell battery design is in its final 
stages of production. One of the 20 flight batteries 
fabricated and tested developed a cell internal short, 
which did not present a safety hazard, but has required 
revisiting the entire manufacturing and testing process.  
Herein are the details of the failure investigation that 
followed to get to root cause of the internal short and the 
corrective actions that will be taken. The resulting lessons 
learned are applicable to most Li-ion battery applications. 
 
Spacesuit Battery Design 
This 20V, 37 Ah spacesuit battery (Fig. 1) 
consists of 5 cell modules connected in series through a 
printed circuit board and housed in an aluminum box. 
This battery has two capped external connectors, J1, 
which connects to spacesuit electrical bus, and J2, which 
connects to an external charger, that can rebalance the 
state of charge (SoC) of each cell module (Fig. 2). Each 
cell module consists of 5 pouch cells (7.4 Ah) whose tabs 
are welded to a pair of terminal blocks. This places the 5 
cells in parallel electrically (Fig. 3). Each cell is roughly 
100x75x9mm, and its electrochemistry consists of 
graphite, cobaltate, and LiPF6 salt (Fig. 4). The cell 
design consists of a single anode and cathode, and two 
layers of separator laminated together as a ~1m x ~100 
mm cell. The substrate foil for the anode and cathode is 
laminated with active material only on one side. The 
laminated cell assembly is then z-folded 15 times into a 
~9 mm thick cell stack. The cell stack is then sealed in a 
plastic-aluminum laminate pouch material.  The five cells 
are stacked and sealed in a similar plastic-aluminum 
laminate outer pouch. The fragile assembly is then placed 
in a mold to be potted with urethane foam to become a 
solid 37Ah cell module brick. The entire battery 
assembly, including the cells, is designed and 
manufactured at Electrovaya Corp., in Mississauga, 
Canada. The cell and cell module acceptance is also 
performed by them, while the majority of the battery 
acceptance testing is done at NASA-JSC. 
 
Current Internal Short Controls 
Each cell is manufactured and extensively 
screened for visual, physical, and other defects such as 
loss of hermeticity, soft shorts, high self-discharge rate, 
anomalous capacity and impedance performance. The cell 
module acceptance testing consists of two capacity and 
impedance performance cycles. The battery acceptance 
testing consists of visual, physical, capacity, and 
impedance verifications before and after thermal cycling 
and random vibration testing.  
For battery s/n 1010, all the verifications were 
completed in Oct 2005 and indicative of a healthy battery. 
After recharging it to 30% SoC, the unit was placed in its 
shipping container until it was called to support a charger 
test in Feb 2006. At this time, one of its cell module was 
found to have an OCV of ~10 mV, while the other 4 
modules where at their nominal 3.78V (30% SoC).  
 
Plausible Root Causes 
 Careful, deliberate, non-destructive, and 
destructive physical examinations (DPA) isolated the 
short to one of the cell pouches within the defective cell 
module, specifically, the outer most cell #5 in the stack 
(Figs. 5 and 6). Specifically, both cell bottom corners 
show evidence of high heat affected zones with their 
centers located very near the corners (Fig. 7). There 
appears to be two “ground zeros” for the short, which 
when fed by the energy of all five cells caused intense 
heating, high enough to melt the copper foil (1084ºC) in 
microscopic locations (Fig. 8). This heat damaged the 
bottom corners of the adjacent cell #4.  No evidence of 
separator failure or foreign object debris (FOD) was 
found. This leaves electrode misalignment, native 
contamination, cold flow through the plastic-aluminum 
laminate, and pouch seal fold impingement as remaining 
possible root causes aggravated by the thermal cycling 
or/and vibration.  
 During the DPA, non-uniformities in the 
thickness of the urethane foam potting around the cell 
module were found in the layers adjacent to the affected 
bottom corners of cell #4 and #5 (Fig. 9).  Thin and thick 
spots could have left the stack of pouch cells unsupported 
at the corners allowing relative motion during vibration. 
This could have aggravated to any of the four root causes 
mentioned earlier.  
 Vibration could have stressed the unsupported 
electrode substrate folds and cause them to tear (Fig. 10). 
This in turn could have damaged the separator and 
allowed misalignment of the electrode folds. Similarly, 
vibration could have caused some active electrode 
material to break loose and contaminate the substrate fold 
area, where no active material should be present. This 
contamination could have cause separator damage and a 
short.  Also, impingement of the cell stack corner against 
the laminate pouch could have causes its plastic outer 
layers to cold flow until the folded cell stack made direct 
contact with the aluminum layer in the pouch. 
Alternatively, the folded pouch seal on the external edges 
and corners of the cells could have damaged the cell 
pouch laminate material at its corner where the pouch is 
drawn (stretched) to form a cup shape for the cell stack. 
This is particularly likely for cell #5, whose edge seal is 
doubly folded in the direction of cell #4, and its resultant 
corner seal fold can result in a very stiff and sharp point 
(Fig. 11). 
 The key facts with which the mechanism of this 
internal short must be consistent are as follows; 
a) The 1 minute/axis random vibration test was 
performed with a ~2A current load and with an 
oscilloscope set to trigger and record any voltage 
step change > 12 mV. None occurred. The 
battery was at 30% SoC. 
b) Nine days later, the battery was charged, 
discharged, and recharged to 30% SoC, with in-
family individual cell module voltage 
measurements throughout. 
c) The pre-test capacity cycling test was performed 
13 days prior to the vibration testing, and results 
very consistent with the post test capacity. 
d) If 2 internal shorts developed during vibration, 
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they must have been of high enough impedance 
to escape detection during the capacity cycling, 
and then, transitioned to low impedance shorts to 
cause the thermal damage on the corners of cell 
#4 and #5. These two shorts must have occurred 
at nearly the same time or else the first short 
would have consumed the cell module energy. 
e) No clear path of heat affected zones exists 
between the two corners that indicates that one 
caused the other.  
 
Root Cause Validation 
 To validate the folded seal impingement theory, 
fully charged cells from the same lot as the flight lot were 
drop tested on their bottom corners from up to 1.5m high. 
When the seal is folded as in the cell#5 configuration, the 
pouch is not breached, even though the corners of cells 
are very deformed. Surprisingly, no anomalous OCV 
decay occurred. When the cell seal is not folded, drops 
from over 60 cm cause corner pouch tears. Two-cell 
stacks representing cell#4 adjacent to cell#5 are planned 
to be dropped to further investigate this theorized root 
cause. 
 To validate the cold flow of the insulating plastic 
layers of the cell pouch, cold flow force measurements are 
planned with the laminate pouch materials. 
 To validate the misalignment of the electrode 
theory, defects in the foam of engineering cell modules 
were introduced at the corners. These defective modules 
were assembled into engineering batteries and vibrated 
very similarly to the flight batteries. So far, no anomalous 
decay in cell module OCVs have occurred.  
 No plan has yet been developed to replicate the 
native material contamination theory.  
 
Corrective Actions 
 The current acceptance screening for the internal 
shorts [1, 2] is only adequate at the cell level. Current 
procedures are inadequate at the cell module level 
because no thermal cycling or vibration is followed with 
capacity cycling tests with appropriate hold times. 
Screening for internal shorts at the completed flight 
battery assembly level is a success oriented approach 
which high risk when a failure is detected.  
 The proposed corrective actions are to perform 
thermal cycle and vibration at the cell module level. This 
should be followed with capacity cycling tests that 
include hold times designed to detect high self-discharge 
and soft shorts. Short shorts are detected by fully 
discharging a cell module at 3.0V to a 125 mA taper 
current and monitoring cell open circuit voltage on day 14 
and 21 of the hold time. Any cell module whose voltage is 
declining between day 14 and 21 is rejected.  At this low 
state of charge, a great majority of soft shorts will 
produce a measurable OCV decay. Once the cell modules 
are cleared for assembly into batteries, battery thermal 
cycling and vibration acceptance testing can be done at 
levels for detecting standard workmanship defects rather 
than the higher levels that had been used to screen for 
internal shorts. 
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Figure 1. Lithium Ion Battery for the Spacesuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Expanded drawing of the Spacesuit Battery 
 
 
Figure 3. One of 5 cell modules in a Spacesuit Battery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. One of the 5 cells that make up a cell module 
 
Figure 5. The five-cell stack of the internally shorted cell 
module after outer pouch was removed. Note the heat 
affected bottom corners of cells 4 & 5. 
 
 
Figure 6. Damaged bottom corner of Cell #5 on top of 
Cell #4 with cell pouches removed. 
 
 
Figure 7. Torn copper substrate folds exposed on the 
bottom corner of cell #5. 
 
Figure 8. Ground zero arc damage on the copper foil 
substrate on a torn side fold near the bottom corner of cell 
#5. 
 
 
Figure 9. Cell module urethane foam with cell #4 in its 
position. This shows the non-uniform thickness of the 
foam layers near the bottom corner.  
 
Figure 10. Unfolded cell #5 stack showing the torn copper 
folds and ground zero of the internal short. 
 
 
Figure 11. Bottom of a nominal 5-cell stack of a cell 
module, showing how the edge and corner seals are 
folded. Note how the edge seal of the top cell (#5) is 
folded differently than the seal of the other cells. 
 
 
 
